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ABSTRACT 
A long-standing debate divides many analysts in the intelligence community over whether structured 
techniques work on complex problems, such as intelligence analysis.1 The non-structured approach has 
become the norm in the intelligence community.2 This article describes both sides of the debate and 
argues that using systematic processes is better than intuition alone. Most importantly, this article asserts 
that the intelligence community should acknowledge the results of the debate and take a major step by 
committing to a uniform set of standards (indicators and methodology) that combine intuition and 
structured technique for the standing intelligence warning topics. Recommendations for implementation 
are described in a proposed methodology model that identifies a uniform set of standards to improve 
intelligence warning. 
 
INTRODUCTION: ACCOUNT OF EPISODES OF WARNING FAILURES 
Using case studies of historic warning failures, warning experts have found that analysts have been repeating the 
same mistakes over time in their analytic judgments and communication.3  The common warning mistakes include, but are 
not limited to, unintentional fractionalized distribution of information, intentional fractionalized distribution of 
information, indicators filtering out pertinent information, interpreting ambiguous information as endorsing favorite 
hypothesis, bias, among others.4  Interpreting ambiguous information as endorsing the favorite hypothesis is one recurring 
error in analytic judgment that occurred in 1941 before the Pearl Harbor attack and again in 2003 when the US misjudged 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 1941, much of the data before the Pearl Harbor attack was consistent with 
more than one hypothesis — an attack was imminent — but analysts interpreted it as supporting their favorite hypotheses, 
those involving no attack. “For every signal that came into the information net in 1941 there were usually several 
plausible alternative explanations, and it is not surprising that our observers and analysts were inclined to select the 
explanations that fitted the popular hypotheses.”5 
More than 50 years later, the US intelligence community repeated the same mistake when the US misjudged 
Iraq’s WMD program. As one warning expert explained:  
The comparative method was not utilized, confirmation bias was rampant, alternative hypotheses were 
not tested, and negative evidence was ignored. . . . This is not to say there were no disagreements. The 
American reports document the sharp splits over whether the aluminum tubes that Iraq was surreptitiously 
importing indicated that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program . . . But no general alternative 
explanations for Saddam’s behavior were offered. There were no “Red Teams” to attack the prevailing 
views; no analyses commissioned from Devil’s Advocates; no papers that weighed competing 
possibilities. . . . [T]he ICs [Intelligence Communities] failed to realize that some evidence that was 
consistent with their interpretations was consistent with other views as well. 6 
 
Ideally, analysts should follow a systematic (although possibly long) process of analysis to identify hypotheses 
and then select the best hypothesis out of the possibilities. However, this is often not done due to time pressures or 
because of mental laziness. As a result, analysts frequently end up just choosing the first hypothesis that seems close 
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enough. “The problem is complicated since in intelligence analysis there is no agreed-upon way to test and verify 
hypotheses.”7 There are principles that show that the credibility of a hypothesis has increased, and analysts should 
establish an agreed-upon method to test hypotheses that uses these principles.  
Another common mistake that occurred in both the attack on Pearl Harbor and the miscalculation of Iraq’s WMD 
was unclear communication. In this warning shortfall, the assessment fails to convey warning because the language is 
ambiguous. Several warnings were issued before the Pearl Harbor attack, but the language was ambiguous and 
consequently did not have the authors’ intended effect. The clearest of those warnings was issued on 27 November 1941:  
This is to be considered a war warning. . . . An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few 
days. . . . The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces 
indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly 
Borneo. 
 
[Admiral Husband] Kimmel was ordered “to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.”8 The authors of the 
warning intended to alert Hawaii to a possible attack, but they left out the word “Hawaii” because they thought that it was 
implied in the analysis that Hawaii was included. Moreover, they thought an attack on Hawaii was a low probability.9 The 
recipients of the warning, on the other hand, took it to mean that “. . . the government leaders [who issued the warning] 
agreed with their assumption that there was no chance at all of a Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor; that the only threats 
to be considered were minor ones.”10 This confusion in communication caused Hawaii to be the only outpost that failed to 
establish an appropriate alert level.11  
More than 50 years later, analysts repeated the mistake of unclear communication in assessments on Iraq’s WMD 
program. Robert Jervis, author of numerous articles on intelligence failure and reform, points out that decision makers 
misunderstood the meaning of intelligence analysts’ terminology describing probabilities in assessments on Iraqi WMD.  
 . . . finished intelligence did not do a good job of conveying levels of certainty to consumers. Post-
mortems reveal that there are no accepted standards for how to do this. The Butler report notes that while 
consumers thought that terms such as “likely” and “probable” were conveying subtle differences of 
meaning, intelligence actually used the terms interchangeably, choosing among them for stylistic 
reasons.12 
 
Lack of standardized language allowed room for ambiguity in the analysts’ communication in both warning 
failures. Notably, analysts repeat the same common mistakes in their analytic judgments and communication regardless of 
which type of information they are assessing. Structured analytic techniques can guard against many of these recurring 
mistakes. 
Correcting Misconceptions  
Important lessons have emerged from the study of intelligence warning failures, but some common 
misconceptions have prevented the intelligence community from recognizing and incorporating these lessons. The first 
lesson is that analysis, rather than collection, is the most effective way to improve warning. The focus on improving 
warning normally turns to intelligence collection, rather than analysis.13 That trend continued after the 11 September 
terrorist attacks.14 Warning failures are rarely due to inadequate intelligence collection, but are more frequently due to 
erroneous analysis, and are most often due to decision makers ignoring intelligence,15 largely because analytic product is 
weak.16 Thus, the problem points mainly to analysis. Empirical research shows that more information does not improve 
the accuracy of analysts’ assessments; it merely improves analysts’ certainty in their assessments.17 Additional research 
finds “an intensified collection effort does not necessarily lead to better analysis and more accurate estimates; when the 
additional information contains a large portion of noise, the risks of another intelligence failure leading to surprise may 
even increase.”18 The evidence suggests there is more value in the available information than current analytical technique 
reveals. The second lesson is that hiring a smart person does not necessarily lead to good analysis. Many argue that “The 
best way to ensure high-quality analysis is to bring high-quality analysts into the process.”19 Their reasoning is that many 
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intelligent minds working together are bound to produce a good assessment. According to research, they are wrong.20 
Studies show that “frequently groups of smart, well-motivated people . . . agree . . . on the wrong solution. . . . They didn’t 
fail because they were stupid. They failed because they followed a poor process in arriving at their decisions.”21 The third 
lesson is that a systematic process is the most effective way to facilitate good analysis. A combination of intuition and 
structured technique in a systematic process is better than intuition alone for intelligence analysis. “Doing something 
systematic is better in almost all cases than seat-of-the-pants prediction.”22 This assertion is the subject of debate in the 
intelligence community. 
The Debate: Intuition versus Structured Technique 
The long-standing debate over whether structured techniques work on complex problems, such as intelligence 
analysis, divides many in the intelligence community.23 Many analysts argue that structured techniques cannot account for 
the infinite number of variables involved in complex problems and that intuition is better.24 The non-structured intuitive 
approach has become the norm in the intelligence community.25 However, others point out that research shows intuitive 
judgments “seldom take proper account of all the information available”26 and that systematic process can do better.27 
Both sides agree that intuition cannot be eliminated from intelligence analysis because a great deal of intelligence 
information is qualitative, or “information that can be captured that is not numerical in nature.”28 Since non-numerical 
information cannot be counted, an analyst must assess its value subjectively using intuition. Structured technique 
proponents point out that researchers have identified many recurring shortcomings in intuitive judgments.29 Since intuition 
cannot be eliminated from intelligence analysis, analysts must find ways to limit their vulnerability to the hidden danger 
of intuition. Structured techniques have been shown to guard against intuitive pitfalls, so some intelligence community 
professionals have proposed applying this technique in intelligence analysis. A key misunderstanding in the debate over 
intuition versus structured technique is that an analyst must choose one or the other.30 In fact, both intuition and structured 
technique can be used together in a systematic process. “Anything that is qualitative can be assigned meaningful 
numerical values. These values can then be manipulated to help us achieve greater insight into the meaning of the data and 
to help us examine specific hypotheses.”31  
Definitions and Distinctions: Intuition, Structured Technique, and Systematic Process 
To understand the debate over intuition versus structured technique, it is necessary to understand three key terms: 
intuition, structured technique, and systematic process. Intuition is “a feeling or instinct that does not use demonstrative 
reasoning processes and cannot be adequately explained by the analyst with the available evidence.”32 The American 
Heritage Dictionary describes intuition as the “act or faculty of knowing or sensing without the use of rational process; 
immediate cognition.”33 Dr. Gary Klein, a pioneer in applying intuitive decision-making theory to national security, 
defines intuition as a “recognitional, pattern-matching process that flows from experience.”34 Cognitive psychologists 
assert that intuition is a “very rapid processing of information by the subconscious, relying on data already reviewed and 
knowledge already possessed.”35 With intuitive analysis, the analyst cannot demonstrate his reasoning process. “In theory 
. . . an intuitive decision can take account of knowledge you possess but can’t put into words. And in principle your mind 
may be able to process information in a more complex and subtle way than you could formalize in a decision rule.”36 
“[J]udgment, insight and intuition. These methods are more abstract, so they are harder to teach. Since they are closer to 
an art than a science, they are also harder to understand.”37 Research on how people with displayed intuition become 
experts found that successful chess masters, mathematicians, tennis players, aircraft pilots, and cab drivers all have 
experience in quickly perceiving large meaningful patterns.38 “Research also suggests that an individual requires 
approximately 10-15 years of experience to become an expert in a field and exhibit intuitive decision-making 
capabilities.”39 “[R]esearch indicates that maximizing the ability to make rapid analytical assessments is related less to 
choosing a person with special capabilities and more to creating and maintaining the motivation for long-term continued 
training.”40 
Structured technique is a method used to “separate and logically organize the constituent elements of a problem 
[in order] to enhance analysis and decision-making.”41 Science is used to develop rules in structured technique. According 
to the scientific rules, a topic is broken down, its multiple components judged, and then formed into an overarching 
assessment of the topic. Structured technique automates recurring judgments (according to the rules), so that they are 
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completed with more speed and accuracy. “Since the process is rational, it can be taught to, and mastered by, almost any 
serious professional.”42 
Systematic process is the combination of the structured technique(s) and intuition.43 Intuition and science are used 
to make judgments at certain steps in the systematic process. This process limits intuitive judgments to small pieces of 
information. Intuition and science are used to determine which structured techniques work best on which topic. Intuition 
and science are used to develop rules on how to best combine structured techniques and intuition into an overall 
systematic process.  
Many structured techniques have been developed for different needs in analysis. Some are very simple 
procedures, while others are complex mathematical formulas or multi-step processes. They all share the function of 
applying consistency in recurring judgments on different sets of data. Examples of structured techniques include lists, 
indicator filtering, and hypothesis testing. Lists are the simplest forms of structure. They assemble items into meaningful 
groups or sequences that help analysts to comprehend, judge, and act on data in an organized and meaningful way. Lists 
enable the mind to deal with larger amounts of data because lists group information into smaller, meaningful sections. 
Indicators are “those [collectable] things that would have to happen and those that would likely happen as [a] scenario 
unfolded.”44 Thus, indicators provide the foundation for warning analysis. Indicator filtering is a technique that enables 
analysts to filter out incoming intelligence that does not meet the criteria of what analysts have judged to be important, 
i.e., the indicators. Since intelligence analysts are overwhelmed with information, indicator filtering is a technique that 
enables analysts to separate the signals from the noise. Computer programs (taxonomies) can help analysts with this 
process by using key words to automate indicator filtering. According to research, computer programs are just as accurate 
as humans in their analysis.45  By combining both, analysts can increase accuracy and save time and manpower.   
Hypothesis testing is the iconic example of structured technique in the intelligence community, and it is the 
fundamental practice of the modern scientific method.46 In hypothesis testing, the analyst tracks evidence that is consistent 
and inconsistent with the potential hypotheses. In the process of hypothesis testing, the goal is to identify the correct 
hypothesis by eliminating or disproving each incorrect hypothesis with one piece of contradictory evidence rather than 
trying to prove a hypothesis by amassing supporting evidence. In controlled scientific experiments, where a piece of 
evidence can be known to be true with 100 percent certainty, only one piece of contradictory evidence is necessary to 
disprove a hypothesis. However, in the intelligence community realm, little information is known with absolute certainty, 
so one piece of contradictory evidence is not always enough to discount a hypothesis. When a piece of information is not 
known for certain to be true, as is often the case in the intelligence community, a person can assign a numerical level of 
confidence or probability percentage to represent the level of certainty. For example, analysts could represent their 
assessment of the validity of a piece of evidence on a five-level scale according to the following standardized language: 
Almost Certainly True (~90%), Probably True (~70%); Unknown (~50%)47; Probably Not True (~30%); Almost Certainly 
Not True (~10%). This technique applies structure by using numerical values rather than just words, which can be 
misunderstood. 
Analysts have a responsibility to improve their communication with decision makers. Richards Heuer, author of 
The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis48 explains: “Verbal expressions of uncertainty — such as possible, probable, 
unlikely, may, and could — have long been recognized as sources of ambiguity and misunderstanding.”49 Although the 
use of precise language may be recognized as valuable, the concept has not had much staying power. Intelligence 
community assessments are not required to give numbered estimates. The subject is still debated today when some 
analysts try to include numbered estimates. 50 Both words and numbers should be used in a standardized, systematic way. 
Decision makers have said they want to hear probabilities rather than wait to hear near certainties. As former Secretary of 
State Colin Powell explained, “What I need to do is operate when the probability of something happening is about, not .2, 
but about .7. I can’t wait until it’s .99 because by then it’s too late.”51   Another benefit of using numbers rather than only 
words to represent assessments is that it enables analysts to combine the assessments according to a consistent quantitative 
rule set. This also enables the use of a computer to combine hundreds of small assessments into an overarching larger 
assessment. 
Once numerical values have been assigned to pieces of evidence, analysts can combine data according to a 
consistent rule set that they judge appropriate for the data. Analysts can perform simple averaging or weighted ranking in 
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averaging, such as giving one factor double the weight of another factor. Utility matrix logic is a simple technique that 
enables an analyst to visually show how two values of two factors cross reference in a matrix to form a value for a third 
factor. Bayesian theorem, also known as Bayes’s Theorem, is a rule set specifically designed for calculating conditional 
probabilities.52 Analysts can create any other mathematical formula that will provide consistency and accuracy in 
repeatedly applying pre-determined intuitive choice(s). For example, if an expert makes an intuitive judgment that factor x 
should carry triple the weight of factor y, then the mathematical formula could consistently, accurately, and quickly apply 
that standard.53 
How Structured Technique Emerged in the Intelligence Community  
Structured technique emerged in the scientific community long before it emerged in the intelligence community. 
Hypothesis testing is the fundamental practice of the modern scientific method and it is the iconic example of structured 
technique in the intelligence community. “The scientific method is not a set of rules . . . Rather it is the general procedure 
that scientists usually follow.”54 Some efforts to apply the scientific method to a topic have not properly followed the 
principles of the scientific method. Those faulty efforts are called pseudoscience.55 Pseudoscience is characterized by over 
reliance on confirming hypotheses rather than disproving them, lack of disclosure of data and methodology for testing by 
others, and the use of vague and untestable claims. Some people have asserted that the effort to apply the scientific 
method to intelligence analysis is pseudoscience because the variables involved in qualitative topics, such as intelligence 
analysis, cannot be fully quantified since they are often “so complex, countless, and incomplete.”56  
Debate over structured technique was sparked in the intelligence community when Richards Heuer began 
conducting “methodological projects in political analyses” in the CIA in the latter half of the 1970s.57 Between 1978 and 
1986, he published his findings in a series of articles “for internal use within the CIA Directorate of Intelligence [DI],”58 
in which he explains that “the initial attitude . . . toward our unconventional [structured technique] proposals typically 
ranged from skepticism to hostility. Equally typical, however, has been their post-project appraisal that the work was 
interesting and well worth doing.”59 Despite this, analysts did not embrace structured technique, citing numerous 
problems, including time constraints.60 
In the mid-1990s, structured technique got significant attention again, this time from Congress and the media 
when policy makers, the media, and the public questioned the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission report on the threat 
of ballistic missiles. The 1998 report’s findings differed from the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic 
missile threat, and critics of the commission’s findings attacked its methodology. The Rumsfeld Commission used 
alternative hypothesis testing and in doing so reported not only on what they knew but also on what they did not know 
regarding alternative hypotheses.61 That technique became a subject of controversy because of the concern that it could 
create an overly alarming assessment.62 
Additionally, Douglas MacEachin, the CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence from 1993 to 1996, launched a 
“major new effort to raise analytical standards” in response to “pressures on CIA for better analytic performance in the 
wake of alleged ‘intelligence failures’ concerning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.”63 MacEachin’s primary efforts to get 
structured technique implemented in analysis included new training requirements on structured techniques with a focus on 
“linchpin analysis” (another phrase for hypothesis testing).64 Overall, as one professional from the CIA intelligence 
community documents, “In the mid-1990s, CIA focused attention on analytic tradecraft and produced a series of notes — 
accessible on the CIA’s website — which elaborate on some of the skills and methods used by [Directorate of 
Intelligence] intelligence analysts, such as addressing U.S. interests in DI assessments, access, and credibility to policy 
makers, articulation of assumptions, use of facts and sourcing, and effective use of unique intelligence.”65 In 1999, 
Heuer’s internal CIA publications were made public in the book Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.66 The book outlines 
a process based on hypothesis testing called “Analysis of Competing Hypotheses” (ACH), which is a “procedure [that] 
was developed by the author for use by intelligence analysts dealing with a set of particularly difficult problems.”67 The 
debate over methodology has continued in intelligence literature as professionals on both sides have published their 
opinions. 
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Arguments for Using Intuition Alone Instead of Structured Techniques 
Argument 1: Many analysts argue that structured techniques cannot account for the infinite number of variables 
involved in complex problems and that intuition can do better.68 “Intelligence analysts who do use non-structured methods 
for qualitative analysis argue that structured methods too narrowly define a problem and ignore factors that cannot be 
measured. They assert that their intuitive approach produces superior results.”69 This argument further contends that the 
application of the scientific method to intelligence analysis is pseudoscience because the variables involved in qualitative 
topics cannot be fully quantified.70 
Argument 2: Even if studies show that structured techniques work on some qualitative problems, intelligence 
analysis involves fundamentally different qualitative problems, so those findings do not apply to intelligence analysis.71 
As James P. Finley explains, “Science can be of little help when dealing with the often irrational and unpredictable human 
mind [which intelligence analysts must assess].”72 
Argument 3: Some analysts argue that structured techniques eliminate or reduce the use of intuition and therefore 
its valuable insights.73 As one naval intelligence officer argues, “Overall, our rational methods are orderly and efficient, 
and they eliminate or reduce intangible factors like judgment, insight, and intuition.”74 
Argument 4: Many people assert that they can “avoid the pitfalls of the mind, such as bias, by simply being aware 
of them.”75 Within the intelligence community, “[m]any scholars suggest that analysts and decision makers alike must be 
more aware of the nature of judgmental biases and of the limitations of the intelligence process if they hope to reduce the 
incidence of surprise attack. This argument holds that if analysts and decision makers become aware of common 
perceptual errors, they may be able to avoid them. . . .”76 
Argument 5: Many analysts argue that structured methods take too long.77 Intelligence Officer Robert Gourley 
explains that “in a crisis decision-making environment . . . [there is] very little time to produce an assessment . . . [and 
there is] ongoing action so that proposed friendly decisions must be instantaneously evaluated and enemy reaction 
forecast.”78 Intuitive proponents further argue that “the military’s use of precision, information-intensive weapons creates 
pressure on the intelligence analyst to deliver useful intelligence at faster rates. In the era of modern warfare, fast and 
precise weapons demand fast and precise intelligence. The intelligence analyst who is unable to conduct analysis quickly 
can create an information bottleneck in this environment.”79  
Gary Klein, a cognitive psychologist and pioneer in applying intuition to national security decision-making, 
asserts, “These [structured technique] strategies sound good, but in practice they are often disappointing. They do not 
work under time pressure because they take too long. Even when there is enough time, they lack flexibility for handling 
rapidly changing field conditions.”80 Richards Heuer, former head of the CIA’s methodology unit in the political analysis 
office, concedes that “the pressures of day-to-day duties, mail, and current intelligence reporting” can be a problem in 
applying structured techniques.81 He acknowledges that structured techniques take time because analysts must complete 
two broad time consuming tasks, decomposition and externalization. 82 “Decomposition means breaking a problem down 
into its component parts. . . . Externalization means getting the decomposed problem out of one’s head and down on paper 
or on a computer screen in some simplified form that shows the main variables, parameters, or elements of the problem 
and how they relate to each other.” 83 Two other structured technique proponents (outside the intelligence community) and 
decision-making researchers, J. Edward Russo and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, acknowledge that “intuitive decision making 
does have at least one advantage. It certainly takes less time than making a decision with the systematic methods. . . . 
Everyone must decide many small questions intuitively.” 84 Former CIA analyst, Stephen Marrin, reports, “According to 
Boston University Professor — and 35-year intelligence veteran — Arthur Hulnick, ‘methodologists discovered that their 
new techniques were unpopular with analysts because they had no time to absorb these systems in the face of tight 
deadlines.’”85 
Arguments for Using Structured Technique (Arguments Against Using Intuition Alone) 
The argument for structured technique is really an argument for combining intuition and structured technique in a 
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systematic process (because intuition cannot be eliminated from intelligence analysis due to the qualitative information 
involved). This is the side of the argument that I support, and I provide some of my personal rationales for doing so 
throughout this section as an addition to the overwhelming evidence that already supports this view. 
Research shows that intuitive judgments “seldom take proper account of all the information available”86 and 
“[d]oing something systematic is better in almost all cases than seat-of-the-pants prediction.”87 Moreover, as military 
intelligence analyst Robert D. Folker points out, “At first glance it seems that opponents of the scientific approach are 
criticizing the results of scientific methods. Yet they offer no empirical data to show which approach produces more 
accurate results, the scientific or the intuitive.”88 Psychological experiments show that there are numerous reasons why 
intuitive judgments rarely account for all the available information. Individuals selectively remember or give weight to 
information based on the vividness and recentness of their exposure to it.89 Information that is seen, heard, or experienced 
first-hand will have more impact on the mind than statistical data, which is impersonal and abstract but has substantially 
greater value as evidence.90 People tend to ignore evidence that does not support their bias and interpret ambiguous 
information as confirming their bias.91 When the mind is overwhelmed with information, the tendency to ignore 
information is magnified as part of a simplification technique to reduce the information down to a manageable size.92 
Furthermore, “intuitive judgments suffer from serious random inconsistencies due to fatigue, boredom, and all the factors 
that make us human.”93  
Studies of medical experts have demonstrated the inconsistency in intuitive judgments. An experiment in which 
psychologists provided information from 96 X-rays to five radiologists found that “[o]n different days, the same expert 
[radiologist] will decide differently even a clear-cut question such as whether an x-ray indicates the presence of cancer.”94 
Moreover, “[p]eople making decisions by intuition alone usually suffer from ‘information overload’ and have a hard time 
applying simple rules consistently even when they try.”95 When overwhelmed with information, the mind makes 
recurring, predictable kinds of mental errors — cognitive biases — as the mind attempts to simplify information that it is 
processing.96 “People have difficulty keeping more than seven or so ‘chunks’ of information in mind at once.”97 A study 
over 40 years ago documented in the article “The Magic Number Seven — Plus or Minus Two,” found that “seven — 
plus or minus two — is the number of things people can keep in their head all at once. That limitation on working 
memory is the source of many problems. People have difficulty grasping a problem in all its complexity. This is why we 
sometimes have trouble making up our minds. For example, we think first about the arguments in favor, and then about 
the arguments against, and we can't keep all those pros and cons in our head at the same time to get an overview of how 
they balance off against each other.”98 
Many fields beside intelligence analysis have shown that being an expert does not create a magical intuition that 
enables a person to make judgments that are liberated from the common pitfalls of the mind as it processes large amounts 
of information. 99 “Indeed, the data shows that when experts fall victim to these traps, the effects can be aggravated by the 
confidence attached to expertise, both in their own view and in the perception of others.”100 This explains why studies 
show that hiring smart people for their intuitive skills does not necessarily lead to good analysis, and that systematic 
process is a more significant factor in coming up with the right decision.101 Studies show that “frequently groups of smart, 
well-motivated people . . . agree . . . on the wrong solution. . . . They didn’t fail because they were stupid. They failed 
because they followed a poor process in arriving at their decisions.”102 For example, according to former Yale University 
psychologist Irving Janis, the planners involved in the disastrous invasion at the Bay of Pigs were “some of the smartest 
people in America. . . .”103 
On the second point, more than 100 studies have shown that “[d]oing something systematic is better in almost all 
cases than seat-of-the-pants prediction.”104 The evidence shows that “[y]ou can develop procedures that will make your 
decision better than your own unaided intuition.”105 In one study, 130 University of Chicago Masters of Business 
Administration (MBA) students were asked to predict grade point averages of applicants intuitively by studying a 
summary sheet of factors about the applicant. The experiment controllers then conducted a regression analysis to 
determine on average what portion of their prediction was based on each factor. Using the data from the regression 
analysis, the experiment controllers created a new set of predictions using a structured technique called “bootstrap 
modeling,” which applied the averaged proportion weights of each factor in a systematic way. The result was that the 
bootstrap-modeling predictions were better than 81 percent of the 130 MBA students’ intuitive predictions. Thus, the 
MBA students could have beat their intuitive predictions if they had applied bootstrapping using their own judgments on 
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how much to weigh each factor.106 The bootstrapping technique has outperformed or equally performed to intuition alone 
in almost every study.107  
There are two key errors in the argument that the application of the scientific method to qualitative intelligence 
analysis is pseudoscience due to the fact that the variables involved in qualitative topics cannot be fully quantified. First, 
in the scientific method, there is no requirement to quantify all the variables. The requirements are: “Stating a Problem . . . 
Collecting Data . . . through observation or measurement, or both . . . Forming Hypotheses . . . Testing Hypotheses . . . the 
scientist uses observation or, more often, experimentation . . . forming a Conclusion.” 108 Another basic expectation of the 
scientific method is to share all data and methodology so others can replicate the study, thereby allowing them to verify 
the results.109 Secondly, other fields in which the scientific method has been acceptably applied, such as physics, biology, 
and medicine diagnostics, also involve “complex, countless, and incomplete variables,”110 yet those applications are not 
considered pseudoscience. Furthermore, some may argue that the application of the scientific method to intelligence 
analysis is pseudoscience because statistical methods for testing hypotheses cannot be used.111 However, that limitation 
does not invalidate the application of the scientific method to the social sciences. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries “the development of probability theory and statistics helped analysts analyze their observations and 
experiments” but they are not necessary.112 The social sciences apply the scientific method differently than the physical 
sciences, but they still apply it in a way that is accepted as a legitimate application.113 “Whenever possible, the scientist 
observes and measures things directly. . . . A physicist, for example, can measure atmospheric pressure with a barometer. 
A sociologist can gauge public opinion on a subject by asking people carefully worded questions.” 114 The same non-
numerical application is thus acceptable for the intelligence field. As Heuer explains, “circumstances and insufficient data 
often preclude the application of rigorous scientific procedures in intelligence analysis — including, in particular, 
statistical methods for testing hypotheses. There is, however, certainly no reason why the basic conceptual strategy of 
looking for contrary evidence cannot be employed.”115 According to scientific method principles, these kinds of 
applications are acceptable as long as the process is made transparent for peer review.116  
Studies show that structured techniques work on qualitative topics that “deal with basic human mental processes 
and the results do seem consistent with personal experience in the Intelligence Community.”117 Therefore, although 
intelligence analysis is a unique kind of qualitative topic, these studies would logically apply to any qualitative topic 
where analysts use basic human mental processes, including intelligence analysis. In 1999, one study focusing specifically 
on intelligence analysis “found that analysts who apply a structured method, hypothesis testing, in this case, to an 
intelligence problem, outperform those who rely on ‘analysis as-art,’ or the intuitive approach.”118 
The human brain behaves the same in processing information regardless of whether the person is an intelligence 
analyst or not. Experimentation and study inside the intelligence community on cognitive biases are limited and are 
provided in large part by Richards Heuer. Heuer reports: “In similar kinds of psychological tests [regarding cognitive 
bias], in which experts, including intelligence analysts, were used as test subjects, the experts showed the same pattern of 
responses as students [non-intelligence test subjects]. . . . All this leads to the conclusion that the three biases are found in 
Intelligence Community personnel as well as in the specific test subjects.”119 MacEachin sums it up: “This is not a 
phenomenon unique to intelligence; as Heuer's research demonstrates, it is part of the natural functioning of the human 
cognitive process, and it has been demonstrated across a broad range of fields ranging from medicine to stock market 
analysis.”120 
Experimentation and study with the use of structured technique in the intelligence community are both limited 
and provided in large part by military intelligence analyst Robert D. Folker.  Folker’s experiment compared the 
assessments of intelligence analysts who used the intuitive approach to intelligence analysts who used the structured 
technique hypothesis testing on two political–military scenarios.121 The experiment was conducted at four of the nine Joint 
Intelligence Centers (JICs) at the US military’s Unified Commands.122 At each JIC, an experimental group of 13 analysts 
were trained on the structured technique hypothesis testing. They and a control group of 13 analysts, who were not given 
the training, were given the same two scenarios. Each analyst individually assessed the scenarios using either the 
structured technique or intuition.123 For both scenarios, the analysts who used structured technique had more correct 
answers than the analysts who used the intuitive approach.124  
Heuer also experimented on structured technique in intelligence analysis. His studies show that “weaknesses and 
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biases inherent in human thinking processes can be demonstrated through carefully designed experiments. They can be 
alleviated by conscious application of tools and techniques that should be in the analytical tradecraft toolkit of all 
intelligence analysts.”125 The bottom line is that there is empirical evidence in the literature that the findings do apply to 
intelligence topics. Case studies and experiments show that “[s]ome structured methodologies . . . complement the 
analyst’s intuition and facilitate creativity,”126 and can speed up the development of an analyst’s intuition.127 An example 
of how structured technique complemented and sped up the development of analysts’ intuition was demonstrated by the 
Royal Dutch/Shell oil company.  The company used a systematic process that involved obtaining numerical levels of 
confidence from analysts and providing regular feedback to analysts. Overconfidence in estimates, a pitfall that plagues 
intelligence analysts, was afflicting new geologists working for the company, costing it billions of dollars in drilling dry 
holes.128 “When young geologists said there was a 50 percent chance of finding oil, oil would be found as little as 30 
percent of the time.” 129 Although the new geologists had impeccable credentials and were made aware of each error, they 
continued to make the error of overconfidence for many years, until finally, “by the time geologists had many years of 
experience, Shell could trust that if they said wells on a dozen sites each had a 50 percent chance of producing oil, about 
half of the wells would produce.” 130 This on-the-job training was taking too long and costing too much money.131 Shell 
then introduced a structured technique into a training program for new geologists. “Inexperienced geologists were shown 
summaries of past cases reflecting the myriad factors that might predict oil deposits. For each, they had to make a 
prediction with a numerical level of confidence. Then, they received feedback, they were told whether or not oil was 
actually found at each of the sites. The training worked wonderfully. Now, when even junior Shell geologists predict there 
is a 50 percent chance of producing oil at a site, the company gets a hit about five times out of ten.”132 In the short training 
program, the new geologists gained the intuitive insight to make more accurate estimates that experienced geologists had 
taken years to develop.   
Heuer makes some key points about the benefits of applying structured technique to intuitive judgments. He says 
these “mental tools . . . help analysts keep an open mind, question assumptions, see different perspectives, develop new 
ideas, and recognize when it is time to change their minds.”133 He further explains that “[l]earning creative problem-
solving techniques does not change an analyst’s native-born talents but helps an analyst achieve his or her full potential. 
Most people have the ability to be more innovative than they themselves realize.”134  
Both Heuer and Folker describe several mental tools including thinking backwards, lists, analysis of competing 
hypotheses, and organized brainstorming. Thinking backwards structures an analyst’s thoughts to go in the reverse 
direction than normal. “Thinking backwards changes the focus from whether something might happen to how it might 
happen. Putting yourself into the future creates a different perspective that keeps you from getting anchored in the present. 
Analysts will often find, to their surprise, that they can construct a quite plausible scenario for an event they had 
previously thought unlikely. Thinking backwards is particularly helpful for events that have a low probability but very 
serious consequences should they occur. . . .”135  “Lists such as [Benjamin] Franklin made are the simplest structures.”136 
The simple process of writing lists (of pros and cons, indicators, alternative hypotheses, etc.) has been shown to stimulate 
creativity. “One specialist in creativity has observed that ‘for the purpose of moving our minds, pencils can serve as 
crowbars — just by writing things down and making lists that stimulate new associations.’”137 Lists stimulate creativity 
because they “let us get the obvious and habitual answers out of the way, so that we can add to the list by thinking of other 
ideas beyond those that came first to mind,”138 and because “they exploit people’s tendency to be a bit compulsive — we 
want to keep adding to them.” 139 It is an accepted truth that analysts need to question their assumptions.140 “Experience 
tells us that when analytical judgments turn out to be wrong, it usually was not because the information was wrong. It was 
because an analyst made one or more faulty assumptions that went unchallenged. The problem is that analysts cannot 
question everything, so where do they focus their attention? . . . One advantage of the competing hypotheses approach . . . 
is that it helps identify the linchpin assumptions that swing a conclusion in one direction or another.”141 Helping analysts 
to recognize those linchpin assumptions that they need to question is a significant accomplishment because the mind is 
very resistant to changing assumptions/expectations,142 “We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive,’’143 and a change 
in an assumption will change the way a person processes new information, which opens an analyst’s mind to recognizing 
if the evidence supports another hypothesis.144 The mind is so resistant to change that it also causes an individual to 
selectively see information that supports an expectation, which compounds the problem of an erroneous judgment. “Many 
experiments have been conducted that show the extraordinary extent to which the information obtained by an observer 
depends upon the observer’s own assumptions and preconceptions. . . . If an analyst cannot think of anything that would 
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cause a change of mind, his or her mind-set may be so deeply entrenched that the analyst cannot see the conflicting 
evidence.”145 Thus, the use of the structured technique analysis of competing hypotheses, can help analysts open their 
minds to new intuitive ideas by showing them the assumptions they should question. Analysis of competing hypotheses 
also increases objectivity by making the assumptions explicit to the reader of the analysis. “Analysts do not achieve 
objective analysis by avoiding preconceptions. . . . Objectivity is achieved by making basic assumptions and reasoning as 
explicit as possible so that they can be challenged by others and analysts can, themselves, examine their validity.”146  
Structured technique expert and former CIA analyst Morgan D. Jones asserts that structured technique actually 
helps our intuition by opening people’s minds. “The fact is structuring one’s analysis is the quickest, surest path to 
opening the mind to alternatives.”147 Being open to alternatives is important because “Failure to consider alternatives fully 
is the most common cause of flawed or incomplete analysis.”148 As Folker explains, research shows that “[s]ome 
structured methodologies, such as organized brainstorming techniques, complement the analyst’s intuition and facilitate 
creativity.”149  
Empirical research shows that “tactics can improve your success beyond what you can achieve simply by being 
aware of the dangers [mental pitfalls].”150 As Heuer explains, “Cognitive biases are similar to optical illusions in that the 
error remains compelling even when one is fully aware of its nature. Awareness of the bias, by itself, does not produce a 
more accurate perception.”151 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency conducted experiments in decision 
analysis to determine whether a person could overcome a cognitive bias by being made aware of it. Tests showed that the 
bias persisted.152 That finding applies to intelligence as well. Heuer replicated the experiment with intelligence analysts 
and got the same results, asserting that his test “supports the validity of the previous findings.”153 
Systematic feedback as a training technique also helped analysts overcome the problem of overconfidence in 
weather forecasting and in bank loan judgments.154  
Believe it or not, such regular feedback (plus training) has given weather forecasters an enviable record of 
reliability. When weather forecasters make a forecast, they see the actual outcome within hours. Thus, 
they learn to make good forecasts. If an experienced weather person says there is a 60 percent chance of 
rain, rain falls 59 percent of the time. When a 90 percent chance of showers is predicted, it rains 87 
percent of the time. By requesting levels of confidence in weather predictions, supervisors in the National 
Weather Service have made the feedback more meaningful and created enormous benefits for themselves, 
for weather forecasters who wanted to improve, and for users of weather forecasts.155  
 
Methodology can in fact save time and maximize the use of time if an analyst makes data entry into a shared 
structured framework part of his daily routine, and even automates certain parts of the process for which the analyst has 
made pre-determined, intuitive choices. Moreover, the difference between crisis and non-crisis situations must be 
acknowledged in discussion of this argument.  
It is true that structured technique is not appropriate in crisis and heat-of-battle situations. The majority of 
intelligence assessments, however, are not created in those situations. Many assessments are created and tracked over 
years, especially intelligence warning assessments, such as a North Korean attack, ballistic missile proliferation, and 
weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Granted, a topic being monitored long-term can eventually become a crisis 
situation. However, if the analyst had been using structured technique up to that point, at least his starting point in the 
crisis would be from an assessment that developed from a rational process that took more of the previous variables into 
account. Structured technique would provide a reference for pattern recognition that might aid the analyst in a moment 
when he must make a fast decision. Even in a crisis situation, there may be time to use structured technique if a system is 
already up and running on a computer, and if it has been designed in a way that allows easy entry of new variables to the 
framework, new data, and new value judgments.  
Analysts still have time constraints in non-crisis situations from the daily requirements of meetings, current 
intelligence, briefings, and email.156 If an analyst makes data entry into the structured framework part of his daily routine 
and automates certain parts of the process for which he has made pre-determined, intuitive choices, then methodology can 
in fact save time rather than consume it. It is true that extra time is required to initially implement a systematic process. 
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This can be done up front and then save time in the future. It is an investment that the intelligence community needs to 
make. 
The majority of intelligence analysis is not done during a crisis. As Folker explains, “[T]he majority of Klein’s 
research has been conducted with leaders in the armed forces and emergency service providers such as firemen, but not 
specifically members of the Intelligence Community. There has always been a clash of cultures between operators 
(commanders and other decision-makers whose focus is on accomplishing the mission at hand) and intelligence analysts. 
As intelligence analysts have attempted to bridge the gap between the two cultures, they have tended to adopt the same 
intuitive decision-making strategies commonly used by operators.”157 There is a time and place for purely intuitive 
decisions, but it is not in intelligence warning analysis, which should be deliberate, well thought-out, and justified with an 
explainable reasoning process. Ultimately, the intelligence community needs to collectively recognize the nature of 
different situations and make a plan that maximizes the opportunities for structured technique whenever possible. 
A Recommended Model for Combining Structured Technique and Intuition in an 
Intelligence Warning Methodology 
If the intelligence community accepts that a universal set of analytic standards must be implemented for the 
standing intelligence-warning topics, then the next step is to identify which techniques are appropriate. No single 
technique can be characterized as the most effective or relevant for intelligence analysis and certain ones are appropriate 
for different phases of the analytic process. Additionally, any given structured technique has both strengths and 
weaknesses. It is important to combine multiple techniques in order to counter these weaknesses. One technique may 
apply to multiple phases of the analytic process. Moreover, the type of problem may affect the technique. For example, an 
indicator list for terrorism would be different from an indicator list for a conventional nation-state attack. Experts may 
judge that indicator X should carry double the weight of indicator Y when assessing situation/enemy A, but vice versa 
when assessing situation/enemy B. Therefore, a formula used to combine multiple indicators into an overarching 
assessment would be adjusted for different situations or enemies. Different audiences or policy makers may have different 
preferences regarding the way they prefer to see and process information. For that reason, the use of multiple techniques is 
valuable in order to cover the variety of preferences, similar to the way teachers present a single lesson in multiple formats 
for each of the auditory, visual, and hands-on learner types. 
The following is a proposed model of the intelligence-warning process. It includes seven broad phases shown in 
Table 2. Structured techniques that are appropriate to support each phase are identified in the table. Seven essential 
elements of this model facilitate the seven phases, as follows: a list of prioritized indicators and indicator question sets 
helps analysts identify the key elements of information required to forecast the selected topic; a list of prioritized 
collection requirements, derived from the indicators and indicator question sets, helps analysts publish an intelligence-
collection plan; a terrorism master database helps analysts consolidate the information that was collected; hypothesis-
matrix templates or web pages that are automatically populated by the master database help analysts sort information; a 
partly automated systematic process that combines intuitive and structured techniques, including hypothesis testing, 
indicator filtering, matrix logic, chronological sorting, and question set guidance, helps analysts draw conclusions; re-
prioritized collection requirements in the intelligence collection plan help analysts focus collectors on intelligence gaps in 
order to refine and update conclusions; and  warning-assessment templates and web pages that combine narratives and 
color-coded warning-level graphics help analysts communicate conclusions and provide warning in multiple standardized 
formats that cater to different preferences. The value of the seven essential elements can be understood in the context of 
an analogy to constructing a building (see Table 2). Also shown in Table 2 is a recommendation on which techniques are 
appropriate to facilitate each phase of the intelligence-warning process. This is not an all-inclusive recommendation; it is a 
starting point to explain the concept of how to select and apply structured techniques in intelligence warning.  
A more detailed explanation of how these techniques would integrate into a comprehensive standardized warning 
methodology for terrorism (which identifies 86 indicators of terrorism) is available upon request. This methodology could 
be applied to any intelligence topic (not just terrorism) by simply changing the list of indicators. The methodology 
consists of 32 tasks within the seven phases, which apply 27 types of structured techniques. The 32 tasks are: 19 daily 
tasks, three monthly tasks, five annual tasks, and five as-required tasks. The 19 daily tasks can be completed in one day, 
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because tasks have been automated wherever possible. Each task explanation indicates whether it is executed by a 
computer program, Raw Reporting Profiler(s), Indicator Specialist(s), Senior Warning Officer(s), or some combination of 
them working together. An analyst can override any automatically calculated value with justification for rejecting the 
computer program, which executes the pre-determined logic agreed upon by the experts. 
Conclusion  
The evidence shows that systematic process is better than intuition alone. Both accuracy and persuasiveness are 
improved with structured technique. Whatever the number of shortfalls a person may cite about structured technique, the 
bottom line is that, despite those shortfalls, systematic process outperforms or equally performs to intuition alone in 
almost every study. More than 100 studies have supported that conclusion.158 The success of structured techniques has 
been demonstrated across a range of topics such as life expectancy of cancer patients, changes in stock prices, mental 
illness using personality tests, grades and attitudes in psychology courses, business failures using financial ratios, 
students’ ratings of teaching effectiveness, performance of life insurance salesmen, and IQ scores using Rorschach 
tests.159 Specifically within the intelligence community, Folker’s experiment conducted at four of the nine JICs at the US 
military’s Unified Commands showed the same results.160 Moreover, regardless of an analyst’s individual opinion, 
decision makers have called on the intelligence community to use methodology. 
The Rumsfeld Commission noted that “. . . an expansion of the methodology used by the IC [Intelligence 
Community] is needed. . . . [Methodology] helps overcome mindset, keeps analysts who are immersed in a mountain of 
new information from raising the bar on what they would consider an alarming threat situation, and allows their minds to 
expand to other possibilities. Keeping chronologies, maintaining databases, and arraying data are not fun or glamorous. 
These techniques are the heavy lifting of analysis, but this is what analysts are supposed to do. If decision makers only 
needed talking heads, those are readily available elsewhere.”161 
Persuasiveness is also improved with the use of structured technique because it can demonstrate a reasoning 
process, which intuition, by definition, does not display. Parties on both sides of the warning communication attest to it, 
intelligence professionals and decision makers (such as Admiral Jeremia,162 the Rumsfeld Commission,163 and Lieutenant 
Colonel Thomas H. Murray, US Army Retired).164 The job of an intelligence analyst is to support decision makers. If 
decision makers say that structured technique will help them understand the message better, then intelligence analysts 
have a responsibility to use it. The only legitimate point against structured technique pertains to time constraints, but it is 
only legitimate for a minority of intelligence assessments. The majority of assessments are not created in crisis situations. 
In all fairness, both intuition and structured technique have pitfalls. The good news is that they can be combined to not 
only guard against each other’s pitfalls but also to enhance each other’s capabilities.  
The intelligence community has taken a small step (and made weak progress) in applying structured technique. 
The current application of structured technique in intelligence analysis is primarily limited to training analysts on a variety 
of techniques to put in their toolkit, but analysts are left to figure it out for themselves if they have the time and 
inclination. That is not nearly enough. The intelligence community needs to take a gigantic step to make strong progress 
in the application of structured technique. The community needs to commit to a uniform set of standards — indicators and 
methodology — for the standing intelligence warning topics. That is the gigantic step that is necessary. “The IC’s 
[Intelligence Community’s] highest priority is warning of threats to US interests worldwide,” as ordered in the US 
Congress’ Intelligence Authorization Act, so a uniform set of standards should be established for the standing intelligence 
warning topics, at the very least. This kind of comprehensive implementation plan is the most powerful way we can make 
significant improvement to analysis. No matter how much the intelligence community increases its efforts to hire experts, 
develop expertise, and restructure and reorganize, it will not improve warning to the extent that comprehensive 
methodology is capable of achieving. 
The method currently used in the intelligence community has been about 30 percent accurate.165 It is plagued with 
shortcomings, many of which we have found ways to guard against with structured technique. We have a responsibility to 
try something new that the evidence shows can guard against recurring pitfalls. However, the debate over intuition versus 
structured technique has been an obstacle to implementing any sort of comprehensive systematic process in intelligence 
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warning. The bottom line is that the intelligence community is spinning its wheels in rehashing this debate. The evidence 
is already in, and it is overwhelmingly in favor of structured technique. It is time to take action. 
Captain Sundri K. Khalsa, United States Marine Corps, has been an intelligence officer since 1996 and is 
currently Director of the Signals Intelligence Officers Course (SIOC). She is the author of Forecasting Intelligence: 
Indicator and Proven Analytic Techniques (2004). 
Table 1. 
 Introductory List of Structured Techniques 
 
 Structured Technique Brief Description 
1) Bayesian theorem  A mathematical formula that was specifically designed for calculating conditional 
probabilities.166  
2) Case studies In depth research into an event/issue/thing/person. 
3) Causal flow diagramming Defines and analyzes a problem’s causes and effects.167 
4) Chronologies/Timelines Arrangement of events in order of the time they occurred. 
5) Color coding Associating a color with a quantitative value or word. 
6) Consolidating Brings together multiple parts into a whole. 
7) Comparative analysis Identifies like and unlike items. 
8) Data mining Computer tagging/profiling of data based on key words. 
9) Devil’s advocacy  Challenges a proposition by seeking contradictory evidence to test its validity.168 
10) Hypothesis testing Tracks evidence that is consistent/supportive and inconsistent/contradictory with the 
potential hypotheses to determine the truth. 
11) Indicator filtering Filters out/discounts incoming intelligence that does not meet the criteria of what analysts 
have judged to be important — the indicators. 
12) Indicators Identify “those [collectable] things that would have to happen and those that would likely 
happen as [a] scenario unfolded.”169  
13) Levels of confidence Assigning a number or probability percentage to represent an assessed level of certainty. 
14) Lists Assembly of items into meaningful groups or sequence, which helps a person to 
comprehend, judge, and act on data in an organized and meaningful way. 
15) Matrix A grid with cells used to separate and organize the elements of a problem.170 
16) Numerical associations Assigning a number to represent the value/significance of a qualitative thing. 
17) Organized brainstorming Generates creative ideas about a topic. 
18) Prioritization  Distinguishes levels of significance among items. 
19) Question sets/trees A set of questions used to determine the validity of a proposition. 
20) Red Teams Used to attack the prevailing views.171 
21) Simple averaging Taking the sum of a list of numbers and dividing it by the count of items in the list, giving 
all items equal weight. 
22) Sorting Dispersing items into meaningful groups. 
23) Standardized language  
(combining words and numbers) 
Assigning a number to explicitly define a word to prevent 
miscommunication/misunderstanding. 
24) Thinking backwards Structures an analyst’s thoughts to go in the reverse direction than normal172 
25) Trend analysis Assembles information and attempts to recognize patterns and anomalies. 
26) Utility matrix logic  Use of a matrix to visually show how two values of two factors cross reference in a matrix 
to form a value for a third factor.  
27) Weighted ranking in averaging Giving varied weights to items before taking an average. 
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Table 2. 
Seven Phases of the Intelligence-Warning Process with Corresponding Essential Elements 
 
The Seven Phases 
of the Intelligence Warning Process 
Seven Essential Elements 
with Analogy to Constructing a Building  Structured Techniques 
I. Identify the Key Elements of  
   Information Required to Forecast a  
   Topic 
1. Indicators and Indicator Question  
    Sets 
    The Building Blocks of a Warning  
    Assessment 
- Lists 
- Indicators 
- Question sets/trees 
- Organized brainstorming 
- Thinking backwards 
- Causal flow diagramming 
- Case studies 
- Trend analysis 
- Sorting 
- Chronologies 
- Prioritization 
II. Publish an Intelligence Collection  
    Plan 
2. Collection Requirements 
    The Purchase Order for the Building  
    Blocks 
- Indicators 
- Question sets/trees 
- Lists 
- Prioritization 
- Numerical associations 
- Utility matrix logic 
III. Consolidate Information 3. “Master Database” 
    The Foundation to Lay All the Building  
    Blocks 
- Consolidating 
IV. Sort Information 4. Hypothesis Matrices 
    The Blueprint of a Warning Assessment 
 
- Indicator filtering 
- Sorting (key word) 
- Data mining 
- Matrices 
V. Draw Conclusions 5. Systematic Process that Combines  
    Intuitive and Structured Techniques 
    The Tools to Build the Blocks 
- Hypothesis testing 
- Red teams 
- Devil’s advocacy  
- Indicator filtering 
- Question sets/trees 
- Numerical associations 
- Levels of confidence 
- Standardized language (combining      
words and numbers) 
- Color coding 
- Matrices 
- Utility matrix logic 
- Simple averaging 
- Weighted ranking in averaging 
- Bayesian theorem  
- Other mathematical formula (to   
combine multiple factors) 
- Trend analysis 
- Comparative analysis 
VI. Focus Collectors on Intelligence  
      Gaps to Refine/Update Conclusions 
6. Re-Prioritized Collection  
    Requirements 
    Repair and Maintenance Requirements 
- Prioritization 
- Numerical associations 
- Standardized language (combining 
words and numbers) 
- Utility matrix logic  
- Indicators 
- Question sets/trees 
- Lists 
VII. Communicate Conclusions/Give  
       Warning 
7. The Warning Assessment Templates    
     that Combine Narratives and Color  
    -Coded Warning Level Graphics 
     The Building 
- Standardized language (combining 
words and numbers) 
- Numerical associations 
- Levels of confidence 
- Color coding 
- Matrices 
- Prioritization 
- Lists 
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